Topic > Case Study on Nixon's Opening of China - 2938

The Complexity of Nixon's Opening of China Anthony Bushong Professor Deborah Larson TA: Galen Jackson Political Science 189 HC March 21, 2014 Introduction In 1972, President Richard Nixon was quoted as saying that his visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC) "changed the world...to build a bridge between sixteen years a thousand miles and twenty-two years of hostility." Meeting with Chairman Mao Zedong in Beijing, Nixon took the first revolutionary steps toward opening relations and formally recognizing the People's Republic of China. The history of the aforementioned hostilities between the United States and the PRC dates back to the Chinese Communist Party's conquest of mainland China following the civil war in the post-World War II period. When the People's Republic of China was formally proclaimed in 1949, near the end of the Chinese Civil War, the United States decided not to recognize its establishment and instead chose to support Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China. This decision was a product of his political environment, as President Harry Truman had just established the Truman Doctrine, which sought to control alleged Communist and Soviet goals of expansion. To remain consistent and credible with its containment policy, a precedent was set and relations between the United States and the PRC remained closed. Tensions were only exacerbated during the Korean War in the 1950s when the PRC intervened on behalf of the North Koreans and during the Vietnam War in the 1970s in support of the North Vietnamese. Therefore, it is understandable that in the eyes of the public, Nixon's meeting with Mao Zedong in 1972 seemed to be a sudden event and difficult to interpret given the context of Sino-American relations over the two decades. ...threat to American interests. Before Kissinger's heavy involvement in Chinese international relations, his specialty was Soviet politics and he was working on his policy known as détente, which reflects a general movement of slow easing of tensions. At first, Kissinger was hesitant when asked to open relations with China, knowing that doing so would anger the Soviets and potentially upset his policies. However, upon visiting his mentor, Kissinger realized that “when you have two enemies, you help the lesser one.” However, it became clear that détente and using China as a power check on the Soviets did not have to be discordant goals, as détente was focused on the effort to “contain” the Soviets and so a visit to China fit perfectly into the plan. This does not mean that other efforts in this direction have not already been made