In this essay I will discuss whether our actions towards animals are immoral. McGinn briefly discusses his reasons, assuming he is right. He states that “we have a moral duty to alleviate the suffering and cease the killing of the animals with which we deal” (McGinn 150). This is the structure of his argument: (1) It is morally wrong to cause animal suffering and death needlessly. (2) We cause animal suffering and death needlessly. Therefore: (3) What we do to animals is morally wrong. As my thesis, I will reject his claim and his arguments that support that claim; I will call his claim “Claim X”. While objecting to this statement seems intuitively horrendous, I believe his argument does not demonstrate the correct basis for readers to empathize with his views. In this article I will critically argue against McGinn's fundamental argument, illustrating the flaws in his supporting claims. After his supporting claims are found to be fallacious, I will demystify this key argument. Finally, to conclude on a high note, I will propose an alternative vision on the issue. To start, I want to first define the terms, as he did in his article. With the term “suffering,” McGinn defines them as follows: “Eating meat, hunting, vivisection, furs, and the like” (McGinns 151). By “similar,” I assume, he meant other activities such as owning animals, using them for entertainment or work. In support of his thesis he makes the following three points. First, it states that the use we make of animals does not justify our means. Secondly, he believes that it is our moral duty not to cause unnecessary suffering to animals. Third and finally, he argues that it is wrong to think of a... means of paper... destroying the environment by destroying animals. If it is our moral duty to preserve the environment, then it is our moral duty to preserve the species that come from it. Therefore, it is morally wrong to allow such species to be used as production material. In conclusion, McGinn's “Claim X” fails, it is not our duty to alleviate the suffering and stop the killing of animals, which we are dealing with. “Claim X” fails because McGinn's supporting points do not have enough force to support the three-premise argument. Because the argument for “Claim X” is not supported, we are inclined to believe that our duty to animals ends when we refrain from abusive, violent, or destructive behavior; but not when animals provide us with benefits that are intrinsic to them. In conclusion, our current interactions with animals do not depict immoral behavior.