The problem of dirty hands, as stated by Michael Walzer, has played an important role in the ongoing discussion about the violation of some moral rules in politics. The basic dilemma states that in politics individuals will often be faced with the need to make a decision between morally questionable actions. Having said that, is it still possible to do the right thing? Among the many situations that might require one to make a mistake in political office is the decision to use torture. A wrong for which a particular distinction has been reserved, as many states and international law prohibit its use. This essay aims to evaluate whether or not torture should be treated differently according to the same logic as the dirty hands argument. It will not evaluate the morality of torture or question the existence of “dirty hands” scenarios, rather it will address the issue of torture in the context of the state's pre-existing and normalized use of violence, and argue that torture, even if perhaps morally questionable, it is not significantly different from other errors and should be evaluated in similar terms. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay “Liberal Democratic Torture” by Steven Lukes provides us with a well-formulated argument for torture as separate from other scenarios of evil hands. For Luke, dirty hands reasoning is not applicable to torture, particularly in the case of liberal democracy where individuals in positions of political power can be held accountable for moral errors they may commit (Luke 12-13). Remembering that in a situation of dirty hands, those involved in politics are not right to do what they deem necessary given some constraints: rather, they may be right precisely because they are aware that what they are doing is wrong, like us, Walzer writes: "it is by his dirty hands that we know him." Liberal democracy allows the public to hold politicians to account for the mistakes they make and, according to Lukes, to critically support the establishment of liberal values. Yet he argues that torture, unlike other institutional wrongs, cannot be held accountable in the same way because it cannot be legitimate and is not punishable. Torture in his opinion commits two "vices", a "vice of concealment", in which the act is not publicly recognized, and is disavowed after having revealed it, as well as a "vice of violence" in which (quoting Henry Shue) the Torture represents a violation of the “primary moral prohibition against attacking the defenseless.” Lukes is careful to point out that this “vice of concealment” is not unique to torture, as there are so many institutional errors committed in secret. Yet these wrongs may be commonly supported under the circumstances, while torture presents this character in tandem with a public attitude that is firmly against its use. Lukes argues that torture is initially so repugnant to the general public precisely because it conflicts with our liberal values ​​of fairness and respect for human dignity. Citing Durkheim, he argues that it “threatens moral disintegration” and undermines the bonds on which the institutions of liberal democracy are based. Therefore, torture does not present the otherwise necessary conditions of a wrong that can be assessed in the dirty hands framework; the distinction given to it as separate from other wrongs is valid. Luke's argument is based on the idea that torture is different in its lack of democratic accountability and the degree to which it violates the principles of liberal-democratic society. To what extent 15).. 2 (1973): 160-80.