The "causal theory" of mind defended by Lewis and Armstrong aims to explain the causal relationship between the mental representation of certain things and people's behavior or other forms of physical embodiment in the outside world. In particular, Armstrong manages to address many logical and philosophical problems faced by behaviorists who sought to present mental and behavioral aspects as inseparable from each other. He demonstrated that all mental concepts can be formulated a priori. Thus, empirical information about physical manifestation can be added to explain the effects of previous mental processes. Therefore, the input-output model can be reconstructed into functional properties indicating the logical distinction between mental causes and behavioral effects (Armstrong, 1970). This analysis is further developed by Lewis in his account of "mad, Martian grief". The case of the madman refers to the situation in which a common stimulus (which causes pain to all other members of the population) does not cause pain in him. However, Lewis shows that a madman can still feel pain, but only when a different factor (atypical for other people) causes it. Alternatively, a Martian may also experience pain, but it may be very different from others in its physical realization (Lewis, 1983). Therefore, the same causes and mental reactions observed in humans lead to very different physical reactions. However, further analysis, according to Lewis, allows us to determine that it is pain by examining the reactions of other Martians who belong to the same group. Overall, it seems that Lewis is mostly wrong to believe that the different requirements of a theory of mind can be coherently integrated. The reason is that his analysis leads to the implicit transformation of individual-based mental causes and behavioral effects to some population generalizations that do not lead to well-supported conclusions. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an Original Essay At the outset, it is reasonable to outline several key strengths of Lewis's argument in his analysis of human behavior and the functions performed by the examples of 'mad and Martian pain'. First, he is right in explaining human (and potentially non-human) diversity in experiencing pain and having other behavioral reactions. It states that people's assessments of the mental state of others are based largely on the similarities and differences observed between their reactions and those of others. If a person shows a very different reaction to a standard stimulus, he or she may be considered crazy. Furthermore, if the deviation from standard or typical behaviors is considerable, this evaluation may be even stronger. In other words, the group tends to demonstrate a negative attitude towards members whose functionalism and behavioral representations are different from those expressed by the majority. Second, Lewis correctly explains that such severe differences do not mean that those people cannot be analyzed, or that their entire behavior is irrational (Lewis, 1983). The ultimate solution is that pain or other reactions can still be triggered but with the help of other factors. Furthermore, he also hypothesizes the possible reactions demonstrated by Martians while experiencing pain. Lewis states that people may initially not be able to correctly interpret the Martians' feelings and perceptions as their physical manifestations of pain may be very different from those expected from humans. However, it offers an approach to use in this regard. ANDIt is possible to consider the behavior and responses of other Martians and determine the cause-effect relationship existing between some external causes (input), mental processes and behavioral manifestations (output). Although it may seem very different from the observed process inhumans, understanding the causal process may allow one to adequately understand Martians even without having any similar mental or physical experience. While the integration of a priori and a posteriori statements can be useful for evaluating the behavior and experiences of other people (and even Martians), there is the central problem of evaluating reactions to pain and other behavioral manifestations from models and by the behavior of the majority of a specific population. While it may be convenient from an empirical point of view to consider the reactions of other humans or Martians, this leads to erroneous and unsupported philosophical conclusions. In particular, Lewis states that the one mad Martian cannot feel pain because he supposedly represents a unique mental state. However, it seems to be incorrect for the following reasons. First, while examining the behavioral reactions of the Martians, Lewis continues to rely on “our” (i.e. human) standards of mental processes and behavior (since he believes they are “our concept”) (Lewis, 1983). However, insanity presupposes a significant deviation from the standards of behavior expressed by the behavior of other members of the same group. Therefore, Lewis should use Martian rather than human standards of expression of grief while analyzing the reaction and responses of a mad Martian. If proper Martian standards are applied, then it can be shown that a mad Martian can exist in exactly the same way as a mad human (although their behavior will be different both in relation to their respectful groups and to each other). Second, Lewis believes that a mad Martian will be characterized by a hidden state that is not mental (Lewis, 1983). This seems to be incorrect because the other Martians are definitely presented as having some form of mental state (although it is different from the human one). This implies that a mad Martian cannot demonstrate non-mental reactions. It will necessarily be mental, but the causes of physical reactions will be different from those of other Martians. Therefore, further investigation of the differences between a mad Martian and other Martians may allow for better supported conclusions. Another problem observed in Lewis's analysis results in the absolutization of the comparative approach used in investigating the mental processes and physical manifestations of people or Martians. He seems to believe that comparison with other members of the same group is the only reliable criterion to use to evaluate “madness” as well as to draw other implications about the mental or physical characteristics observed. To demonstrate the fallacy of this view, it is possible to imagine a Being X different from both humans and Martians. Furthermore, it is unique in the sense that there are no other known beings of the same type. In this case, applying the traditional Lewis approach would not allow one to draw any reliable conclusions or implications about Being X. The reason is that there is no possibility of comparing him with other similar beings and drawing any implications from his mental processes. It is plausible that Lewis claims that the state is hidden and not mental (because this case is even more complicated than that of a mad Martian). However, the mental nature of Being X's reactions can be understood by observing various factors and his subsequent reactions. Both the factors and the physical manifestation may be very different from those expected by humans and Martians, but it.