MacIntyre and DeterminismBehavior is a rather interesting aspect of man to observe. Throughout the day we demonstrate different types of behavior, from eating certain foods to speaking in certain ways. But what matters most is rational behavior. Behavior is rational "if, and only if, it can be influenced or inhibited by the adduction of some logically relevant consideration." (p.297) In his essay MacIntyre tries to show us that rational behavior is not causally determined, but that it derives from our free will. The discovery of causal explanations for our actions, and the like, shows, or attempts to show, that we could not have done differently than we did. From this, then, there would be no meaning to morality, which has been at the forefront of human thought for centuries. But on the other hand, to say that human behavior is inexplicable is to deny everything we have learned from the sciences. We have already given the definition of rational behavior, but in this definition we find a point that needs to be clarified, that of a behavior that is a logically relevant consideration. What exactly is a logically relevant consideration? Well, what is logically relevant will necessarily vary from case to case. And it can vary so much that MacIntyre even goes so far as to say that "the task of philosophy could almost be defined as the task of defining 'logical relevance'." (p. 297) Rational behavior is then said to be defined with reference to the possibility of altering it by some logically relevant consideration. Therefore, to demonstrate that a behavior is rational it is sufficient to demonstrate that it is not causally determined, in the sense that it is the effect of certain conditions beyond a person's control. Since there is rational behavior, it follows that there is such a thing, non-rational behavior. Nonrational behavior is, of course, behavior that does not take logically relevant considerations into account. Such an act can be said to be impulsive. As in all philosophical discourses, the opposing side usually proposes a counterattack. In this case, the determinist launched a three-step counterattack against free actions. First, the determinist argues that, in the broadest sense of the term cause, giving a reason can function as a cause. MacIntyre argues against this by stating that "acting because you have been given reasons to act would not necessarily mean acting in a causally determined way"..