It can be admitted that if a person lies to another on the premise of a selfish goal in which he is the only person to receive benefits, such as a person who borrows money without the intent to return it it, as in Kant's example in section 4:22, effectively treats that other person solely as a means to some other end, and thus defies the second formulation which dictates that others should not be seen purely as a means to other ends. However, as with the first formulation, there is the possibility that lying admits qualifications and results in an imperfect duty. If lying to another is supposed to be beneficial, as in the case where a small permissible lie can increase one's confidence and therefore one's chances of success, or similarly when promising insincerely can lead someone to go out and acquire a valuable life experience, they wouldn't. have gained otherwise, lying has the potential to prevent harm, but actually generates positive consequences. If so, lying could still be seen as an imperfect duty, unlike the perfect duty advocated by Kant, and should not only avoid blame, but be celebrated because it helps another.