Since the 1999 Davis ruling, federal circuit courts have heard numerous cases of peer-to-peer sexual harassment. While that's not exactly the amount of litigation envisioned by the dissent in the Davis case, there are enough cases to determine that federal circuit courts of appeals are not entirely comfortable with the Davis standard. Although federal courts understand the general test set forth in Davis, they are struggling to define vague terms within the Davis test. As a result, courts have interpreted the Davis standard narrowly, mindful of the unanswered questions. This conservative approach has led to very few successful Title IX lawsuits by students for student-on-student sexual harassment. Federal courts, while understanding the general Davis standard, still vary in their presentation of the essential elements of Davis liability. Although some circuits focus primarily on the specifically numbered Davis elements, Title IX liability requires that 1) the sexual harassment be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it is likely to deprive the complainant of access to educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school; 2) the grant recipient had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment; and 3) the recipient of the funding was deliberately indifferent to the harassment n125: Other circuits also include an element that the school district must have the power to exercise substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs. n126However, how federal circuits have defined each of these elements varies widely, with different circuits commenting on the lack of guidance in O'Connor Davis' opinion. n127 As a result, the courts were left searching for... middle of paper......seen. n197 Although the victim's mother was assured that precautions would be taken, "no steps were actually taken to minimize or stop the harassment. The specific request that Renee not be alone in the presence of Boy A was ignored. Possibly , these actions amount to deliberate indifference to the harassment concerns brought to Renee's teachers by her mother." n198The two-step process used in Murrell and Vance is superior for defining Davis' standard of deliberate indifference. Courts must ask whether a response was made following the initial complaint of sexual harassment and whether that response was effective in discouraging continued sexual harassment. Otherwise, futile remedial efforts, or efforts that come too late to protect a student from severely debilitating acts of sexual harassment, become a loophole through which schools can escape Title IX liability.