UT Place, like any physicalist (or materialist), faces the arduous task of explaining consciousness in terms of contemporary science. While (almost) everyone, I suppose, would accept the claim that there is a connection, to some extent, between consciousness and the brain, a physicalist would seem to have to go a step further and claim that the two are the same thing. What. Now, the claim that consciousness is identical to, and therefore nothing more than, a brain process (or processes) may be impossible to prove; however, in Is Consciousness A Brain Process?, Place does not attempt to establish this claim. But Place argues that the identity theory, that consciousness is one or more processes in the brain, cannot be “rejected on logical grounds alone” (p.44). Next, he cites an objection to the identity theory presented by Sir Charles Sherrington. My goal in this short article will be to explain Sherrington's objection and Place's response to that objection. Sir Charles Sherrington argues that there is an ever-present, perception-evaluating “self,” which...