In this article, Paul raises the interesting idea that having a child is epistemically transformative and, in some cases, can be personally transformative. As a result, our lack of knowledge about what it means to have a child prevents us from making the rational decision to have a child. In this article I will focus on the epistemically transformative qualities of having a child as opposed to the personally transformative qualities of having a child for two reasons. First, although having a child is universally epistemically transformative (as Paul argues), it is not universally personally transformative. Second, the idea that having a child is transformative on a personal level relies on testimony, something Paul warns us is an unreliable source of information. The concept that childbirth is epistemically transformative raises some questions: Is childbirth unique in being epistemically transformative, and can we ever know the expected value of an epistemically transformative decision? I answer no to the first and yes to the second, and I will explain my answer as follows. First, I will lay out Paul's argument and add additional reasons to support those arguments that I think she doesn't really explore. Second, I argue that most people do not make decisions based solely on phenomenal factors, and that even if they make decisions based solely on phenomenal factors, those decisions can be rational. Finally, I argue that Paul's argument runs the risk of being exaggerated, and that it doesn't matter if our decisions, especially the decision to have a child, cannot be rational. Paul's argument is that, according to the normative model of decision making, the decision to have a child can never be rational. For Paul, the normative decision… at the center of the card… as for the agent plays the central, if not the only” role in this decision, as does the claim that most people make their decision to procreate in this way. However, I believe that very few people actually make their decision based solely on phenomenal results. I think this is a reductive statement that belittles the many reasons that inform the decision to have children. Paul herself rejects the idea that individuals can decide “[to have a child] solely on the chance that [they] will end up in a class of individuals who maximize their overall utility.” This is because he believes the claim that anyone can base their decision on a single factor – in this case, the possibility of maximizing utility – is unrealistic. Likewise, the idea of ​​someone basing their decisions solely on what they think having a child would be like seems unrealistic.