Topic > Conservatism and innovation: a new perspective on...

In this thesis I propose a new philosophical framework for the philosophy of physics as an alternative to the existing debate on scientific realism and antirealism. This reconsideration of the debate is justified by the widely shared perception of a disconnect between philosophy and the practices it aims to describe. Specifically, I offer a shift in focus from analyzing physicists' justificatory practices to examining the methodologies evident in the presentation of theories. I will show that this scientific activity can be described in terms of the tension between a “conservative” strategy and an “innovative” strategy. This interaction will be demonstrated in two case studies. The first case is HA Lorentz's search for an absolute reference system for space and time. The second case is the current search for dark matter. The debate between scientific realism and antirealism revolves around the relevance of epistemology to metaphysics. Realists argue that our best sciences provide information about the real nature of the physical world. He might, for example, appeal to the “no miracles” argument. However, this tactic presupposes the realist's preferred relationship between evidence and nature. Against this view, the antirealist argues that the product of scientific inquiry is a description of observable phenomena and not of an underlying reality. In general, antirealists have emphasized historical evidence against the realist image and have advanced arguments in favor of one form of instrumentalism or another. At present, it appears that the problem is unsolvable. Structural realism, a variant of scientific realism, aims to address anti-realist criticism while maintaining a realist sensibility. Rather than focusing… in the middle of the paper… the tension between these two strategies is what drives scientific progress. By testing the applicability of existing principles and introducing new principles with broader domains of applicability, physicists aim to capture more phenomena with fewer principles. Two examples illustrate the effect of this framework in the philosophy of physics. First, I will examine H. A. Lorentz's theoretical practices in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. I will demonstrate that Lorentz maintained a conservative strategy, even as the evidence against him mounted. This strategy failed when his preferred principles were replaced by those of Einstein. My second example is the continued search for further evidence of the existence of dark matter. Those who seek physical evidence for the applicability of general relativity pursue the conservative strategy and those who offer new principles follow the innovative one.